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By progressively eliminating sacrifice, Christian revelation 
has accelerated an escalation to extremes. What will have 
been the error of the West is its refusal to understand 
the advent of Christianity as a liberating maturity, an 
anti‑sacrificial education.
    René Girard1
In an interview I conducted with René Girard in 2007 (and which appears in 
this volume for the first time in Portuguese), he mused:
I think that if I had written Violence and the Sacred after 9/11, I would have most 
probably included 9/11 in this book. This is the event that makes possible an under‑
standing of the modern event, for it renders the archaic more intelligible. 9/11 
represents a strange return of the archaic within the secularism of our time. Not 
too long ago people would have had a Christian reaction to 9/11. Now they have an 
archaic reaction, which does not bode well for the future.2
The idea of the irruption of the archaic in the modern is at the heart of 
Girard’s latest book Achever Clausewitz (literally: Completing Clausewitz), which 
examines the insights of the Prussian military theorist in light of the devastating 
conflicts of the past two centuries. What attracts Girard to Clausewitz’s classic 
but unfinished tome, On War, is Clausewitz’s deep understanding of a transitional 
moment in the history of warfare: the shift from an aristocratic concept of war 
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that is inherently limited – war between warriors – to what has become known 
as “total war,” that is, war between entire societies that is in principle limitless in 
scope and potential for destruction.3 Thus despite Clausewitz’s predilection for 
rationalizing war, according to his famous assertion that war is under the control 
of politics, that war is “politics by other means,” his thesis is necessarily over‑
whelmed, in Girard’s view, by the very irrationality of the “escalation to extremes” 
(Steigerung bis zum Äußersten) that Clausewitz sees as war’s implacable reality. 
More urgently, from Girard’s perspective, Clausewitz allows us to understand 
this new era in the history of warfare in terms of apocalyptic thought, that is, 
as imparting to the apocalyptic texts a more concrete and specifically historical 
meaning that should arouse our concern. This is what Achever Clausewitz aims to 
accomplish: to “complete” Clausewitz’s On War by revealing its essentially apoca‑
lyptic dimension.4 
In his book, Girard treats Clausewitz as kind of a secular theorist of the 
apocalypse. Given that Girard himself has been considered a secularizer of sorts 
(particularly at the time of his Violence and the Sacred), one can easily see how 
Girard’s project of demystification would find in the author of On War a useful ally. 
Indeed, the often uncanny proximity between many of Clausewitz’s formulations 
and Girard’s own insights provides fertile ground for Girard’s reinterpretation of 
the apocalyptic texts.5 
Achever Clausewitz can be said to represent a “fourth” phase of Girardian 
thinking, which could be termed “apocalyptic.” 6 It develops Girard’s previously 
elaborated argument that Christianity, in demystifying the scapegoat mecha‑
nism (by showing that the victim of collective violence is innocent), has also 
deprived humanity of the primordial way of managing its violence, namely, 
through the safety valve of sacrifice, thereby placing it before a stark choice: 
eventual self‑destruction or the renunciation of violence.7 According to Girard, 
our apocalyptic future, instead of being immediate as many early Christians had 
expected, has instead been the work of many centuries; the development of a 
system of justice has largely controlled intra‑communal violence; but on the level 
of inter‑communal violence, namely war, we have, during the past few centuries, 
witnessed an incredible escalation, culminating in the world wars of the twentieth 
century and the global terrorism of the twenty first. Our capacity to deny or ignore 
this apocalyptic reality, whether under the aegis of Enlightenment notions of 
“progress” or twentieth‑century theories of “containment,” puts us in ever greater 
danger. Unlike the fundamentalist doomsayers, Girard sees the apocalyptic threat 
to humanity not as an external menace, a manifestation of divine violence,8 but as 
an immanent logic of history, stemming from the failure of humanity to deal with 
  |  39René Girard’s apocalyptic modernity
the implications of the secularization of violence (see Dupuy, 2004). However, our 
apocalyptic future is not, for Girard, a fate to be accepted, but the beginning of 
hope; for “hope is only possible if we dare to think the perils of our time” (Girard, 
2007: 16). Humanity is free and is therefore responsible for its own violence. 
This Sartrean or “existentialist” dimension of Girard’s thought, though generally 
suppressed in his writings, becomes more apparent in Achever Clausewitz.  
  
an anti‑Sacrificial education
In his introduction to Achever Clausewitz, Girard summarizes his life’s work 
on the anthropology of religion:
My work has often been presented as an investigation of archaic religion, through the 
methodology of comparative anthropology. This approach aimed at elucidating what 
has been called the process of hominisation, this fascinating shift from animality to 
humanity that occurred so many thousands of years ago. My hypothesis is mimetic: it 
is because humans imitate each other more than animals that they had to find a way 
of overcoming a contagious similitude, prone to causing the complete annihilation of 
their society. This mechanism – which reintroduces difference at the very moment 
when everyone becomes similar to one another – is sacrifice. Man is born of sacrifice 
and is thus a child of religion. What I call, following Freud, the foundational murder 
– namely, the killing of a sacrificial victim, responsible for both the disorder and the 
restoration of order – has constantly been reenacted in rites and rituals, which are 
at the origin of our institutions. Millions of innocent victims have thus been sacri‑
ficed since the dawn of humanity to allow their fellow men to live together or, more 
precisely, to not destroy themselves. Such is the implacable logic of the sacred, which 
the myths dissimulate less and less as man becomes more self‑aware. The decisive 
moment of this evolution is Christian revelation, a sort of divine expiation in which 
God in the person of his Son will ask man for forgiveness for having waited so long to 
reveal to him the mechanisms of his violence. The rites had slowly educated him; now 
he was ready to do without them. 
It is Christianity that demystifies religion, and this demystification, while good in the 
absolute, proved to be bad in the relative, for we were not prepared to receive it. We 
are not Christian enough. One can formulate this paradox in another manner and 
say that Christianity is the only religion that will have foreseen its own failure. This 
prescience is called the apocalypse. (Girard, 2007: 9‑10, my translation)
In revealing the innocence of the victim of collective violence, the story of 
Christ demystifies the mythic apprehension of the victim as guilty and respon‑
sible; i.e., it demystifies the logic of the scapegoating, which, for Girard, was the 
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principal way in which human beings were able to contain and control violence 
within their communities. Violence is “inherent” to human communities because 
human beings are “mimetic.” According to Girard’s theory of “mimetic desire” 
(expounded in his first book, Mensonge romantique et vérité romesque, 1961), we 
desire not the intrinsic qualities of an object but according to another person, who 
becomes a model and a rival for us (and for whom we can also be a model and 
a rival); this inevitably brings us into a relation of conflict, with the potential for 
physical violence. Without external constraints, such as those of a legal system, 
violence begets violence in cycles of increasingly uncontrollable vengeance (nega‑
tive reciprocity) that eventually engulf the entire community.9 Thus archaic 
societies, lacking a public system of justice, were highly unstable. What accounts 
for their survival? Why did they not simply destroy themselves? Doubtless many 
of them did destroy themselves; but those that survived had discovered a unique 
way of dealing with their runaway violence. According to Girard, it was the scape‑
goat mechanism – which focuses all the animosity on a single individual who is 
seen as responsible for the crisis – that allows the community to transcend its 
violence. The peace resulting from the unanimity forged by the concentration on 
a single victim who is put to death or expelled institutes the sacred, in the assump‑
tion that the victim who brings about an end to the crisis, who converts disorder 
into order, thereby saving the community, possesses some transcendental power. 
Thus, in archaic societies, violence is the sacred; sacrifice is the (sacred, unifying) 
violence that ends violence. The ritualization of this scapegoating violence is the 
origin of religious and cultural institutions. 
Christ also proposes to save the human community, but in a radically different 
way, a way that, as Girard argues, exposes humanity to new dangers. The fact that 
the story of the Crucifixion is told from the perspective of the victim – unlike 
myths, which are told from the perspective of the persecutors – makes all the 
difference; for the Gospels allow us to see scapegoating for what it really is: the 
putting to death of an innocent victim. Christianity is therefore only sacrificial in 
appearance; it is, in fact, the “sacrifice” that demystifies sacrifice.10 
Christianity leads us out of archaic religion, but at the price of losing the 
fundamental check on violence that had preserved human communities.11 For 
once, the truth of scapegoating is revealed, it ceases to function as such; it loses 
its potency as a unifying force. Scapegoating is based on a collective misrecog‑
nition or self‑deception regarding its operation. For scapegoating to enable the 
calming of a mimetic crisis, the victim must be seen as guilty, by all, so that 
the fury of the entire community can be effectively directed toward him/her. 
To perceive the scapegoat qua scapegoat, to invoke the term “scapegoating” in 
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a given situation, is ipso facto to see the victim as victim.12 In its revelation of 
the truth of scapegoating, Christianity inevitably becomes, in Girard’s account, 
a source of disorder and instability.
But the Christian demystification is only partial. As Girard remarks in the 
above passage, we were not prepared to receive this truth. The presence of scape‑
goating in modern times can thus be seen as evidence of the continuing influence 
of the archaic mindset. Spontaneous lynchings in the American South as well 
as the calculated demonization and destruction of the Jews and other groups in 
Nazi Germany are prime examples of modern instances of scapegoating.13 But 
in a modern context, scapegoating inevitably fails to bring about peace; for it is 
a false sacred. “Violence, which produced the sacred, now produces only itself,” 
Girard observes (Girard, 2007). Modern scapegoating functions not as a break 
on violence but, on the contrary, as an escalation – precisely the opposite of what 
Girard had observed in archaic societies. Because victimization fails to bring 
about the peace that scapegoating promises (by ridding the community of the 
“guilty” party), ever more victims are required to “purge” or “purify” the commu‑
nity, ad infinitum. Girard notes that “people forget that the model I proposed 
[in Violence and the Sacred] was meant only for archaic societies” (Girard, 2007: 
244). Modern instances of scapegoating lack the complete misrecognition that 
enables the mechanism to work. A minimal recognition that the victim is innocent 
(the very calculated nature of Nazi propaganda shows that its inventors did not 
completely believe it) inflames the passions of the persecutors who thereby seek 
to validate themselves by seeking out more and more victims. (In some instances, 
such as purges of religious or political heretics, the victims are made to “confess” 
their “crimes,” to create the aura of “guilt” and unanimous condemnation). When 
there are no more victims of the “guilty group” available, the population of victims 
is simply enlarged, thereby revealing the self‑devouring nature of the process. The 
Terror of the French Revolution is a perfect example of scapegoating devouring 
the scapegoaters: Robespierre is led to the guillotine by the very forces that he 
himself set into motion.14
The development of a public system of justice generally coincides with the 
end of sacrifice as an institution within a given community. However, there is 
an inexpugnable sacrificial element in even the most modern system of justice: 
“our penal system operates according to principles of justice that are in no real 
conflict with the concept of revenge,” writes Girard in Violence and the Sacred. 
This mixture of the archaic within the modern is usually dissimulated in the 
notion of “justice,” a concept that is invoked as the opposite of vigilantism. But, 
Girard remarks, 
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the same principle is at work in all systems of violent retribution. Either the principle is 
just, and justice is therefore inherent in the idea of vengeance, or there is no justice to 
be found anywhere. He who exacts his own vengeance is said to “take the law into his 
own hands.” There is no difference in principle between public and private vengeance; 
but on the social level, the difference is enormous. Under the public system, an act of 
vengeance is no longer avenged; the process is terminated, the danger of escalation 
averted. (Girard, 1977: 16) 
In other words, like sacrifice, the system of public justice puts an end to the 
cycle of violence by imitating the “all against one” (unanimity) condition of scape‑
goating. The entire community takes “revenge,” as it were, on the guilty one. The 
fact that the “guilty one” is so determined by a rational, organized process rather 
than a spontaneous, unorganized one does not in the least alter their formal 
resemblance.15  
But this remedy – whether through sacrifice or the institution of the penal 
system – has of course no bearing on conflicts between sovereign or autonomous 
communities. It appears somewhat paradoxical that the mastery of violence on 
one level (the end of personal violence – revenge killings, duels, blood feuds, 
etc. – as an acceptable outlet for grievances, i.e., the monopolization of violence 
by the state) coincides with the exponential increase of violence on another: war 
between states or factions within states, and now, international terrorism such 
as the attacks of September 11, 2001. It is as if we have been moving forward and 
backward simultaneously. We feel more secure within our respective communi‑
ties, and yet worry that the world will explode.16 The world wars of the twentieth 
century and the nuclear threat are usually cited as signs of this ultimate escalation, 
but its origins can be traced to the European conflicts of the late eighteenth and 
early nineteenth centuries.  
  
the Democratization of War and the escalation to extremes
The West’s current aversion to war (a “last resort”) often obscures the fact 
that for much of Western civilization war was a venerable, self‑regulating institu‑
tion, with its own rules, codes of conduct, conventions, etcetera. The institution 
of war, dominated by aristocratic concepts derived from chivalry, contained the 
violence of war within prescribed limits. With the dismantling of war as an insti‑
tution, these limits are progressively removed, and violence tends more and more 
to follow its own logic. Girard observes that 
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this waning of an institution [war] that had as its goal to restrain and regulate violence, 
corroborates my central hypothesis, namely that we have been witnessing for over 
two centuries the disintegration of all rituals, all institutions. Through its codes and 
rules, war contributed to the general order by working toward new equilibriums... It 
ceased to play this role, generally speaking, since the end of the Second World War. 
(Girard, 2007: 26) 
One can thus view the treaties of the Geneva Convention as a response to 
this collapse of war as an institution. These treaties attempted to regulate with 
legal restraints what had been the exclusive purview of tradition and culture. 
Whereas, for example, it had previously been considered unseemly or dishonor‑
able to mistreat or kill prisoners of war, this was now a matter of international law. 
In effect, the Geneva Convention and, more recently, the International Criminal 
Court at The Hague, aspire to achieve on the international level what the estab‑
lishment of a public system of justice had accomplished on the community level. 
But the former is infinitely weaker than the latter, for the obvious reason that there 
is no international sovereign. 
While these manifestations of international consensus offer glimmers of 
hope, the advent of global terrorism has rendered such international agreements 
less and less relevant, opening up new possibilities for escalation. Instead of rein‑
forcing or expanding international juridical institutions, the “war on terror” has in 
fact marked a retreat into national sovereignty. Girard remarks: 
The disgrace of Guantanamo... is indicative of this contempt for the laws of war. 
Classic warfare, which consisted in respecting the right of prisoners, no longer exists. 
It still existed to some extent in the conflicts of the twentieth century. War was still 
minimally understood as a kind of contract. The persistence of the laws of war within 
the explosiveness of the wars of the past century shows that its origins go back very 
far, to feudalism, to a very old aristocracy. (Girard, 2007: 131)   
Throughout Achever Clausewitz, Girard seeks to emphasize that the long 
transitional period that begins with the escalation of war in the Revolutionary 
and Napoleonic period and culminates in the age of global terrorism has not been 
accompanied by any effective – juridical or cultural – counterbalance. Our apoca‑
lyptic future had been deferred, on the one hand, by the regulation of private 
violence in a system of justice,17 and, on the other, by the ritualization of war 
(originating in the Middle Ages and extending through the gentlemanly guerres 
en dentelles [“wars in lace”] of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries),18 which 
regulated public violence. The removal of curbs on warfare coupled with rapid 
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technological advances in weaponry has brought our apocalyptic future closer 
upon us. This is what Girard calls the “acceleration of history.”  
We must, however, consider what appears to be a stunning paradox: that 
democratization has coincided with the escalation of war and international 
conflict (even if totalitarian regimes have been responsible for much of the esca‑
lation of the twentieth century). This fact is obscured by the commonplace that 
democracies are far less likely to engage in wars of aggression and actively seek to 
control violent factors that might affect them. The European Union (the disaster 
in the former Yugoslavia aside) would indeed appear to be a shining example of 
this principle.19 And yet, how to explain the obvious connection between the 
development of “total war” and democratization? Girard does not treat this ques‑
tion in any detail in Achever Clausewitz, though I think that it merits examination. 
Total war makes its appearance during the French Revolution, with the mass 
conscription of citizens, thereby transforming a royal army that served the king 
into a citizens’ army that served the nation. Girard notes that “it is democracy 
that invented [mass conscription], the power to mobilize the population” (Girard, 
2007: 241), a power that monarchies did not possess prior to that time. (In fact, 
European monarchies were quite resistant to conscription. They feared that the 
raising of “citizens’ armies” would upset their countries’ social organization, 
precipitating a de facto democratization that would incite demand for political 
reform–with the French Revolution as a terrifying model.) The mass mobilization 
of the citizenry is ipso facto an escalation of war, for other countries are inevitably 
obliged to do the same in order to maintain the equilibrium – as the Napole‑
onic wars amply demonstrated. In addition, in total war the distinction between 
civilian and military is blurred as war becomes an enterprise of the entire nation; 
civilian centers are increasingly seen as legitimate targets of military action.20 
The advantages of conscription were two‑fold: a much larger army could be 
raised quickly, when needed, and, perhaps more importantly, the psychological 
effect of citizens who fought not for personal honor (the aristocratic ideal) or 
money (mercenaries), but for the nation (patriotism),21 gave soldiers a cohesive‑
ness and sense of purpose that armies of aristocrats and mercenaries lacked. 
(However, when national passions are inflamed, patriotism can also be trans‑
formed into a negative attitude: hatred of the enemy – something that was foreign 
to the aristocratic concept.22 And an army that hates its adversary is of course 
more likely to commit atrocities.) The victories by the Revolutionary and Napo‑
leonic armies over foes that were both more numerous and more experienced 
demonstrated the superiority of this manner of military organization, in addition, 
of course, to Napoleon’s undeniable strategic genius (but without conscription 
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Napoleon could not have done what he did). Fed by conscription, the armies and 
battles grew exponentially in size; some battles involved hundreds of thousands of 
soldiers. Napoleon, leading his aptly named grande armée, exploited the advan‑
tages of these military escalations, though in the end he was consumed by them. 
As historian David Bell insightfully observes, “it was the radical intensification of 
war that brought [Napoleon] to prominence and power, and in the end, he could 
not contain it. He was, in turn, the product, master, and victim of total war” (Bell, 
2007: 8). 
The one person in early eighteenth‑century Europe who understood this 
dynamic was Carl von Clausewitz, an officer in the Prussian army. In 1812, he 
observed: “it is not [now] the king who wages war on the king, not an army against 
another army, but a people against another people” (quoted in Bell, 2007: 10). 
This idea figures prominently in his theory of war; for Clausewitz recognized 
the inherent potential for escalation in the democratization of warfare. Monar‑
chies of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries fought each other with little 
effect on their home populations. Their armies were predictably small and were 
drawn from the ranks of professional soldiers. Clausewitz sees war between such 
armies as inherently limited: “the means [these monarchies] had available were 
fairly well defined, and each could gauge the other side’s potential in terms of both 
numbers and of time. War was thus deprived of its most dangerous feature – its 
tendency toward the extreme, and of the whole chain of possibilities which would 
follow” (Clausewitz, 1976: 589). Thus war between peoples that could mobilize an 
indeterminate number of soldiers – total war – is particularly prone to extreme 
escalations. 
In the programmatic first chapter of his On War, Clausewitz describes three 
“extremes”:
War is an act of force, and there is no logical limit to the application of that force. 
Each side, therefore, compels its opponent to follow suit; a reciprocal action is started 
which must lead in theory to extremes. This is the first case of interaction and the 
first “extreme” we meet with. [...] So long as I have not overthrown my opponent I 
am bound to fear he may overthrow me. Thus I am not in control: he dictates to me 
as much as I dictate to him. This is the second case of interaction, and it leads to the 
second “extreme.” [...] Assuming you arrive in this way at a reasonably accurate esti‑
mate of the enemy’s power of resistance, you can adjust your own efforts accordingly; 
that is, you can either increase them until they surpass the enemy’s or, if this is beyond 
your means, you can make your efforts as great as possible. But the enemy will do the 
same; competition will again result and, in pure theory, it must again force you to 
extremes. This is the third case of interaction and the third “extreme.” (Clausewitz, 
1976: 77, original emphasis)23 
46  |  Robert Doran
It is not quite clear why there should be “three” extremes, since all three 
describe the effects of “reciprocal” or “competitive” action. This is what Girard 
calls “mimetic rivalry”: each one imitates the other; each rival tries to outdo 
the other in series of one‑upmanships of ever increasing intensity. When the 
rivals are two armies or two countries at war, the most extreme violence is 
not only possible but is inscribed in the very relation of mimetic rivalry or 
“reciprocal action” itself. Though Clausewitz never uses the word “imitation” 
to describe violent interaction, his proximity to Girardian thinking is difficult 
to deny. 
However, Clausewitz attempts to evade the apocalyptic consequences of 
his theory by cloistering this logic of extremes within the realm of pure theory. 
Clausewitz argues that one must distinguish between the pure concept of war and 
its actual manifestation:     
Warfare thus eludes the strict theoretical requirement that extremes of force be 
applied. [...] Once the antagonists have ceased to be mere figments of a theory and 
become actual states and governments, when war is no longer a theoretical affair but a 
series of actions obeying its own particular laws, reality supplies the data from which 
we can deduce the unknown that lies ahead. (Girard, 2007: 80)
Girard endeavors to deconstruct this opposition between the theoretical and 
the actual; for if Clausewitz’s theory of war is anthropological at bottom (and not 
the “war by algebra” that Clausewitz derides [Clausewitz, 1976: 76]) then no such 
absolute separation between theory and practice is possible. On Girard’s reading, 
Clausewitz is simply in bad faith when he seemingly dismisses the apocalyptic 
implications of this logic of extremes: “Clausewitz prefers to mask his intuitions 
in allowing his readers to believe that war is still what it was in the eighteenth 
century, and that politics could contain it. This is his Enlightenment side. But 
this mask can no longer be maintained; we already perceive why” (Girard, 2007: 
81). Thus Girard sees Clausewitz’s famous declaration that “war is not a mere 
act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political activity 
by other means” (Clausewitz, 1976: 87), as a way of covering over the disturbing 
reality of his theory of extremes; for if war is under the control of politics, then 
war will always be restrained by a minimal rationality. But, for Girard, there is 
nothing “purely theoretical” about “reciprocal action”; this potential for negative 
reciprocity (the exchange of blows) is rooted in our mimetic nature. To see war 
as an “escalation to extremes” is to realize that it will always threaten to outstrip 
politics, to rage beyond the control of any rationality. To think war according to a 
logic of extremes is ipso facto to engage in apocalyptic thinking.  
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Nevertheless, there are moments in which Clausewitz appears to admit 
that the escalation to extremes is not merely theoretical, such as the following 
passage from the section entitled “Absolute War and Real War,” near the end of 
his book:
One might wonder whether there is any truth at all in our concept of the absolute 
character of war were it not for the fact that with our own eyes we have seen warfare 
achieve this state of absolute perfection. [...] War in [Napoleon’s] hands, was waged 
without respite until the enemy succumbed, and the counterblows were struck with 
almost equal energy. Surely it is both natural and inescapable that this phenomenon 
should cause us to turn again to the pure concept of war with all of its rigorous impli‑
cations. (Clausewitz, 1976: 580)
This passage clearly shows the coincidence between theory (war as “pure 
concept” or “absolute perfection”) and reality in the Napoleonic war machine. 
Clausewitz had himself experienced these “extremes”: in Napoleon’s crushing 
victory over the Prussians in 1806 at the battle of Jena‑Auerstedt.24 Referring to 
this disastrous defeat, Clausewitz could not help observing that 
without the cautionary examples of the destructive power of war unleashed, theory 
would preach to deaf ears. No one would have believed possible what has now been 
experienced by all. [...] Would [Prussia] in 1806, have risked war with France with 
100,000 men, if she had suspected that the first shot would set off a mine that was to 
blow her to the skies? (Clausewitz, 1976: 581)
The theory of extremes is here effectively merged with its historical actuality. 
Napoleon had made the apocalypse into a concrete concept. 
Global terrorism and total War
Using Clausewitz’s theory of extremes, can we not also consider global 
terrorism to be a form of absolute war, tending toward “pure” violence, i.e., 
violence that outstrips politics? Girard contends that “we must think in Clausewit‑
zian terms about what the introduction of terrorism represents today. At bottom, 
it is an intensification of total war in the sense of Hitler or Stalin” (Girard, 2007: 
129). Terrorism is total war in the sense that it recognizes no distinction between 
military and civilian targets (the attacks of September 11, 2001 included both). 
Civilian targets are often preferred, for they are more efficacious in attracting 
attention and eliciting a response. Indeed, one could argue that the primary 
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objective of Al Qaeda terrorism is escalation itself. And what is terrorism, after all, 
if not asymmetrical provocation? As Lawrence Wright, the Pulitzer Prize author 
of The Looming Tower: Al Qaeda and the Road to 9/11 (2006), observes in his 
article “The Master Plan: For the New Theorists of Jihad, Al Qaeda is just the 
Beginning,” escalation was the “goal”:
[Bin Laden’s] goal, for at least five years, had been to goad America into invading 
Afghanistan, an ambition that had caused him to continually raise the stakes – the 
simultaneous bombings of the United States Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, in 
August, 1998, followed by the attack on an American warship in the harbor of Aden, 
Yemen, in October, 2000. Neither of those actions had led the United States to send 
troops to Afghanistan. After the attacks on New York and Washington, however, it 
was clear that there would be an overwhelming response. Al Qaeda members began 
sending their families home and preparing for war. (Wright, 2006)
Because the United State was measured in its response to the first Al Qaeda 
attacks, treating them as law enforcement issues, Al Qaeda was led to up the 
ante, as it were, to get the “reciprocity” it desired; this was 9/11. Bin Laden had 
imagined that in their ensuing invasion of Afghanistan, the Americans would get 
bogged down, as did the Russians in the 1980s, and that, just as the USSR had 
collapsed after ten years of unsuccessful war, the American republic would suffer 
a similar fate. Yet this was only to be the first step on the way to a “total confronta‑
tion” on a global scale.25
Despite the extreme challenge that global terrorism and “rogue nations” (Iran, 
North Korea) have presented to international institutions, the only real solution 
to the escalation of violence remains the strengthening of these institutions. As 
Girard observes in Violence and the Sacred, in a very different context than that of 
Achever Clausewitz, “as long as there exists no sovereign and independent body 
capable of taking the place of the injured party and taking upon itself the respon‑
sibility for revenge, the dangers of interminable escalation remain” (Girard, [1972] 
1977: 17). Can we not apply this insight to the world situation? If so, it would seem 
that only a world system of justice that is “sovereign and independent” can tran‑
scend global violence and forestall our apocalyptic future. 
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2 “Apocalyptic Thinking after 9/11: An Interview with René Girard,” SubStance 37.1 [2008]: 25.
3 The term “total war” was coined not by Clausewitz but by a German military officer, General 
Ludendorff, whose memoir, Der Totale Krieg, was published after World War I. This concept of 
“total war” is not to be confused with Clausewitz’s notion of “absolute war” Vernichtungskrieg. This 
later concept is a theoretical construct that imagines a pure state of war. See the chapter entitled 
“Absolute War and Real War” in Carl von Clausewitz, 1976: 579‑581.   
4 “Achever ce qu’il [Clausewitz] n’a fait qu’entrevoir, c’est retrouver ce qu’il y a de plus profond dans 
le christianisme” (Girard, 2007: 151).
5 Prior to Achever Clausewitz, Girard had never studied war per se. Had Girard focused on Clause‑
witz earlier in his career, On War would have no doubt figured prominently in his work.
6 The first three phases of Girard’s thought are: the mimetic theory of desire (Mensonge romantique 
et vérité romanesque, 1961); the theory of archaic religion and sacrifice (La violence et le sacré, 
1972); and the theory of the Christian deconstruction of myth in the Gospels (Les choses cachées 
depuis la fondation du monde, 1978). 
7 “Le Christ impose donc une alternative terrible: ou le suivre en renonçant à la violence, ou accélérer 
la fin des temps” (Christ places us before a terrible choice: either follow him in renouncing violence, 
or accelerate the end of days) (Girard, 2007: 149). 
8 “The only Christians who still speak about the apocalypse are the fundamentalists, but they make 
it into a completely mythological idea. They think that the violence of the end of time will come 
from God himself; they require the notion of a vindictive God. Strangely, they do not see that the 
violence gathering over our very own heads has all of the necessary qualities to unleash the worst. 
They have no sense of humor” (Girard, 2007: 21). However, this is not merely an attitude of reli‑
gious fundamentalists. Erich Pratt, the director of communications for Gun Owners of America, 
was recently quoted in the New York Times as follows: “These politicians need to remember that 
these [gun] rights aren’t given to us by them. They come from God. They are God‑given rights. 
They can’t be infringed or limited in any way. What are they going to do: limit it two or three 
rounds. Having lots of ammunition is critical, especially if the police are not around and you need 
to be able to defend yourself against mobs.” (The New York Times, January 14, 2011).
9 As Girard remarks on many occasions, man is the only animal that fights to the death. All other 
animals fight for dominance; that is, the weaker submits to the stronger thereby ending the violent 
encounter before it leads to death. 
10 Girard has recently been somewhat ambivalent about the relation between Christianity and sacri‑
fice: “Christianity has always been sacrificial. It’s true I gave the nonsacrificial interpretation too 
much importance — in order to be heretical. That is what was left of the avant‑gardist attitude in 
me. I had to be against the Church in some way. The attitude was instinctive, since my whole intel‑
lectual training came out of surrealism, existentialism and so forth, which were all anti‑Christian. 
It was probably a good thing, for the book might not otherwise have been successful” (Doran, 
[2008]: 30).
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11 This formulation bears a superficial resemblance to Marcel Gauchet’s famous dictum, “Christianity 
is the religion of the exiting of religion”; but Gauchet’s idea is very different. See Gauchet, 1997: 101.
12 Thus those who feel that they are being falsely accused will often apply the term “scapegoat” to 
themselves, thereby drawing attention to their innocence.
13 In terrorist attacks the innocent (non‑military, civilian) are often targeted; they are effectively 
scapegoats; but this follows the more general logic of the blurring of the lines between civilian and 
military that is the hallmark of total war. 
14 Even such common terms as “fall guy” (Webster’s New Dictionary: “a person made the victim, or 
left to face the consequences, of a scheme that has miscarried”) testify to this dynamic. Like “scape‑
goat,” the use of the term “fall guy” implies an awareness that the condemned person is innocent or 
only minimally responsible for what he/her is being blamed. Thus the archaic instinct to project or 
cast blame in scapegoating is still a somewhat effective way of directing and channeling rage, even 
if its operation is partially transparent.      
15 And the fact that in the United States white juries are more likely to convict back defendants testi‑
fies to this dynamic. 
16 Girard observes in the interview mentioned above: “Jacques Maritain said that there is more good 
and more bad in the world all the time. I think this is an excellent formula. In other words, the 
world is both more Christian and less Christian, constantly. But it is fundamentally disorganized 
by Christianity” (Doran, [2008]: 27).
17 The progressive elimination of dueling in the nineteenth century is a case in point. Dueling was 
almost always against the law, but widely practiced at this time as an expression of the aristo‑
cratic code of honor. Here democratization and the effective mastery of violence coincide in a legal 
system that provides “justice for all.” 
18 As David Bell notes, “[during the 1700s] military leaders saw their adversaries largely as honorable 
equals. This is not to say that war was not horrific. War is by definition horrific. But historians 
need to be able to make distinctions between shades of horror, and if the eighteenth century did 
not exactly reduce the slavering dogs of war to ‘performing poodles’ (as Sir Michael Howard once 
jokingly put it) its conflicts still ranked among the least horrific in European history.” Bell’s book, 
entitled The First Total War: Napoleon’s Europe and the Birth of Warfare as We Know It, addresses 
many of the same issues as Girard’s Achever Clausewitz, and, coincidentally, was published the 
same year (2007). Inspired by Clausewitz’s analyses, both see the origins of total war in the Revo‑
lutionary and Napoleonic era; and both see the advent of total war in apocalyptic terms. Bell 
remarks that the European conflicts from 1792 to 1815 “deserv[e] the adjective ‘apocalyptic’” (Bell, 
2007: 7). 
19 Though the only nation ever to use an atomic bomb in war was a democracy, the United States.
20 The atomic bomb attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in Japan and the firebombing of Dresden in 
Germany during the Second World War are clearly the culmination of this blurring of distinction 
between civilian and military targets.  
21 For an incisive discussion of the genesis of patriotism in France, see Bell, 2001, The Cult of the 
Nation in France: Inventing Nationalism 1680‑1800, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
22 This aristocratic respect for the enemy is admirably shown in Jean Renoir’s film about World War I, 
La grande illusion (1937). See my essay, “Jean Renoir’s Grand Illusion: An Antiwar Film?” in The 
(In)visibility of War, ed. Isabel Gil, forthcoming.  
23 In his very helpful On Clausewitz: A Study of Military and Political Ideas (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2005, 88), Hugh Smith summarizes the three extremes as follows: “once force has been 
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introduced there is no logical limit to its employment; each belligerent fears the other will seek to 
overthrow him; and each belligerent feels compelled to match or outdo the enemy’s exertions.” 
24 Clausewitz’s unit was forced to surrender and he was taken to France as a prisoner. He returned to 
Prussia in the spring of 1808. 
25 Wright also reports they had a long term plan for global domination: “The sixth phase will be a 
period of ‘total confrontation.’ The now established caliphate will form an Islamic Army and will 
instigate a worldwide fight between the ‘believers’ and the ‘non‑believers.’ [Radical Jordanian jour‑
nalist Fouad] Hussein proclaims, ‘The world will realize the meaning of real terrorism.’ By 2020, 
‘definitive victory’ will have been achieved. Victory, according to the Al Qaeda ideologues, means 
that ‘falsehood will come to an end. ... The Islamic state will lead the human race once again to the 
shore of safety and the oasis of happiness’” (Wright, 2006).
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